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UNPEELING THE GROWING SPLIT UNDER THE ATS:
CARDONA V. CHIQUITA BRANDS INTERNATIONAL, INC.
Anastasia Stylianou
I. INTRODUCTION
The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals’ application of the Alien Tort Statute (“ATS”) in
its recent decision Cardona v. Chiquita Brands International, Inc.1 demonstrates a mechanical
and restrictive application of the holding of the Supreme Court decision Kiobel v. Royal Dutch
Petroleum Company.2 The Eleventh Circuit declared that none of the relevant conduct took place
within the United States and thus, ruled that United States courts lacked the power to review the
claims of over four thousand Colombians who sought to hold Chiquita Brands International
(“Chiquita”) liable for the deaths of family members.3
In March 2007, Chiquita pled guilty to a federal felony of knowingly providing material
support to the Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia (“AUC”), an illegal paramilitary organization
notorious for its mass murder of Colombian civilians.4 Under the plea agreement, the Justice
Department accepted Chiquita’s assertion that the support amounted to payment for protection
and that Chiquita never received services in exchange from the AUC paramilitaries.5 It took four

1

760 F.3d 1185 (11th Cir. 2014).
133 U.S. 1659 (2013).
3
Cardona, 760 F.3d at 1188.
4
Brief for Plaintiffs-Appellants at 1, Cardona v. Chiquita Brands Int’l, 760 F. 3d 1185 (2014) (No. 12-14898).
“Chiquita’s assistance to the AUC was a federal crime because the U.S. Government had officially designated the
AUC a ‘Foreign Terrorist Organization’ and a ‘Specially Designated Global Terrorist,’ and thus, a threat to the
security of foreign policy of the United States.” Id.
5
Jim Lobe & Aprille Muscara, US banana firm hired Colombia paramilitaries, ALJAZEERA (April 8, 2011 2:28
PM), http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2011/04/20114813392621189.html. “No executives were charged
under the deal, which was reached when Chiquita was represented by then-Covington & Burling LLP lawyer Eric
Holder, now the U.S. attorney general.” Erik Larson & Christie Smythe, Chiquita Wins Dismisssal of U.S. Suits on
Colombia Torture, BLOOMBERGBUSINESSWEEK (July 25, 2014), http://www.businessweek.com/news/2014-0724/chiquita-wins-dismissal-of-u-dot-s-dot-suits-over-colombia-torture.
2

years for the United States government to investigate Chiquita’s support for the AUC, which was
“prolonged, steady, and substantial” — over seven years from 1997–2004.6
Contrary to claims by Chiquita that these payments were extorted, internal company
documents published by the National Security Archive (“NSA”), an independent research group,
strongly suggested that the transactions provided specific benefits to Chiquita.7 By its own
account, Chiquita paid the AUC $1.7 million and also “assisted the AUC in smuggling arms and
ammunition with full knowledge that the AUC was a violent organization responsible for crimes
against humanity.”8 Throughout the seven-year duration, 3,778 people were murdered in Uraba,
with an additional 60,000 forced into what is now the second largest internally displaced
population in the world.9 “The company, having knowingly and repeatedly approved transactions
its own lawyers were flagging, also went to great lengths to disguise the payments, using special
vocabulary in company accounting records and various intermediaries on the ground in
Colombia,” but none of the dozens of high level officials who approved the payments have been
prosecuted, nor have any reparations been paid to the victims.10 Chiquita executives classified
the payments as “the cost of doing business in Colombia;” a cost that included a shipment of
three thousand AK-47 assault rifles and five million rounds of ammunition.11 Nevertheless,

Brief for Plaintiffs-Appellants at 1, Cardona v. Chiquita Brands Int’l, 760 F. 3d 1185 (2014) (No. 12-14898).
Jim Lobe & Aprille Muscara, US banana form hired Colombia paramilitaries, ALJAZEERA (April 8, 2011 2:28
PM), http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2011/04/20114813392621189.html. The documents consist of more
than 5,500 pages of internal Chiquita memos which “reinforce the claim…that the company was knowingly
complicit I, and thus liable for, the atrocities committed by the AUC” while on the Chiquita payroll. Id. (quoting
Arturo Carrillo, director of George Washington University’s International Human Rights Clinic).
8
Brief for Plaintiffs-Appellants at 1–2, Cardona v. Chiquita Brands Int’l, 760 F. 3d 1185 (2014) (No. 12-14898).
“What makes this conduct so morally repugnant is that the company went forward month after month, year after
year, to pay the same terrorists.” Sentencing Hr’g Tr. At 29.
9
Steven Cohen, How Chiquita Bananas Undermined The Global War on Terror, THINK PROGRESS (Aug. 2, 2014
2:45 PM), http://thinkprogress.org/world/2014/08/02/3466915/chiquita-colombia-ruling/.
10
Id.
11
Associated Press, Chiquita accused of funding Colombia terrorists, CBS NEWS (May 31, 2011 8:20 AM),
http://www.cbsnews.com/news/chiquita-accused-of-funding-colombia-terrorists/. In a 1997 handwritten note, one
Chiquita executives said such payments are the “cost of doing business in Colombia. . . [n]eed to keep this very
confidential—people can get killed.” Id.
6
7
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Chiquita maintains that it only paid militias to protect employees and that Chiquita should not be
held responsible for the tragic violence that has plagued Colombia. 12 Chiquita aided the AUC
because it benefitted from the AUC’s pacification of the banana-growing regions and the
suppression of labor, union activity and other social unrest that could have harmed Chiquita’s
operations.13
This note argues that the dissent in Cardona was correct in that the connections to the
United States displaced the presumption against extraterritoriality. Chiquita is incorporated and
headquartered in the United States and Chiquita’s participation in reviewing, approving, and
concealing a scheme of payments and weapons shipments to a Colombian terrorist organization
all took place from its United States based corporate offices. Part II of this note will discuss the
foundation of ATS litigation, beginning with enactment of the 1789 Judiciary Act through the
Kiobel decision. Additionally, Part III will outline the growing split amongst circuit courts and
analyze their disparate application of Kiobel. Finally, Part IV will examine Cardona by
reconsidering the dissent and exploring the divergent treatment of corporate liability and aiding
and abetting liability under the ATS and their relevance to the reexamination of Cardona, as well
as certain international and human rights doctrinal debates which are implicated through ATS
litigation.
II. THE HISTORY OF THE ALIEN TORT STATUTE

12

Erik Larson & Christie Smythe, Chiquita Wins Dismisssal of U.S. Suits on Colombia Torture,
BLOOMBERGBUSINESSWEEK (July 25, 2014), http://www.businessweek.com/news/2014-07-24/chiquita-winsdismissal-of-u-dot-s-dot-suits-over-colombia-torture.
13
Brief for Plaintiffs-Appellants at 2, 10–13, Cardona v. Chiquita Brands Int’l, 760 F. 3d 1185 (2014) (No. 1214898) (Through this strategic alliance, Chiquita was able to eliminate union organizers and others it perceived as
hostile to its interests, and whom the AUC perceived as guerilla sympathizers, reduce operating costs, and eliminate
disruptions and competition.).
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The ATS was enacted in 1789 as part of the Judiciary Act that established the federal
court system, in order to grant the national government control over foreign affairs. 14 However,
the ATS, in effect, lay dormant and was essentially ignored for over two centuries, until its
revival in 1980 by way of the Second Circuit Court of Appeals decision in Filartiga v. PenaIrala,15 and the rapid expansion of the human rights movement in the late twentieth century.16
A. Revival of the ATS: Filartiga v. Pena-Irala
Filartiga concerns the fatal kidnapping and torture of Joelito Filartiga in Paraguay in
1976, by Americo Peña-Irala, a Paraguayan police officer, in retaliation for the human rights
advocacy and political beliefs of Joelito’s father, a Paraguayan physician and activist. Dr.
Filartiga commenced a criminal action in the Paraguayan courts against Pena, unaware that Pena
had fled to the U.S..17 Joelito’s sister, who was then living in Washington, D.C., caused Pena to
be served with a complaint that Pena had wrongfully caused the death of her brother by torture. 18
The district court dismissed the case holding that, although official torture violates the norm of
customary international law, the court was constrained by dicta contained in two recent opinions
of the court which construed narrowly that the law did not apply to the state’s torture of its own
citizens.19
During the six months in which the Filartiga appeal was pending, the Iran Hostage Crisis
occurred, in which Iranian students took hundreds of U.S. citizens hostage and seized the U.S.

28 U.S.C. §1350 (2006) (“The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for a
tort only, committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States”); Judiciary Act of 1789, ch.
20, s 9(b), 1 Stat. 73, 77 (1789), codified at 28 U.S.C. s 1350.
15
630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980).
16
Id. at 880 (referring to the ATS as a “rarely-invoked provision”); See also IIT v. Vencap, Ltd., 519 F.2d 1001,
1015 (2d Cir. 1975) (calling the ATS “a kind of legal Lohengrin; although it has been with us since the first
Judiciary Act, s 9, 1 Stat. 73, 77 (1789), no one seems to know whence it came”).
17
Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 878–79.
18
Id.
19
Id. at 880 (citing Dreyfus v. von Finck, 534 F.2d. 24 (2d Cir. 1976); IIT v. Vencap, LTD., 519 F.2d 1001 (2d Cir.
1975)).
14
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embassy in Tehran four over fourteen months, in response to the decision to permit the exiled
Shah to receive medical treatment in New York. The impact of this national crisis on the court’s
deliberations was discussed in the memoirs of the judicial clerk who drafted the Filartiga
decision as a tense choice between national ideals and national interests.20
The Executive branch filed an amicus brief supporting the Filartiga’s view that the ATS
provided jurisdiction over their claim because the ATS incorporates an evolving body of
international law, the judiciary had the authority to decide the case despite foreign affairs
implications, that international law affords individual rights that can be directly enforced in
domestic courts, and that litigation in Paraguay would not be possible.21 Less than a month after
the Executive branch filed its brief, the court in Filartiga held that the official torture is
unambiguously prohibited by the law of nations, noting that the ultimate scope of the
fundamental rights conferred by international law “will be subject to continuing refinement.”22
Further, the court held that the ATS affords federal jurisdiction for adjudication over claims that
violate universally accepted norms of international law.23
B. Cautious Optimism: Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic
After Filartiga the first judicial response came in Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic,24
where the court agreed that the claims alleging ATS jurisdiction based on acts of terrorism—
specifically an armed attack on a civilian bus in Israel—should be dismissed, but disagreed as to
the reasoning illustrated by the three separate concurring opinions.25 Judge Edwards largely

Beth Stephens, The Curious History of the Alien Tort Statute, 89 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1467, 1481 (2014).
Memorandum for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 5, Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d. Cir. 1980)
(No. 79-6090).
22
Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 884 (2d. Cir. 1980) (concluding that the dictum in Dreyfus v. von Finck relied on by the
district court “is clearly out of tune with the current usage and practice of international law”).
23
Id. at 887.
24
726 F.2d 774, 776 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
25
Compare Tel-Oren, 726 F.2d at 776 (Edwards, J., concurring) with Tel-Oren, 726 F.2d at 823 (Robb, J.,
concurring).
20
21
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adhered to the legal principles established in Filartiga, but found that factual distinctions
precluded a finding of subject matter jurisdiction and Judge Robb would have dismissed the case
on political question grounds.26
Further, Judge Bork insisted that the federal courts had no power to recognize a cause of
action for the claims at issue in either Filartiga or Tel-Oren because such a cause of action
would intrude upon the foreign affairs powers of the executive branch, as these claims could not
possibly have been what the drafters of the ATS intended.27 Judge Bork’s critical response to
Filartiga stemmed from a formalist notion of separation of powers that, implicitly, reject the
vision of the ATS as a mechanism for developing international law norms.28
C. Affirmation of Modern ATS Litigation: Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain
In 2004, the Supreme Court made its first pronouncement on the ATS in Sosa v.
Alvarez-Machain,29 which determined that the ATS was purely jurisdictional, and “is best read
as having been enacted on the understanding that the common law would provide a cause of
action for the modest number of international law violations with a potential for personal liability
at the time.”30 Additionally, the Court held that the jurisdictional grant of the ATS took effect
from the moment of its enactment, as it was not passed “to be place on the shelf for use by a
future Congress or state legislature.”31
Sosa involved a Drug and Enforcement Agency (“DEA”) agent who was captured on
assignment in Mexico, tortured and killed.32 Based on eyewitness testimony, DEA officials
believed Alvarez, a Mexican physician, was present at the house to prolong the agent’s life in
Tel-Oren, 726 F.2d at 776.
Id. at 798-823 (Bork, J., concurring).
28
Id. at 801 (Bork, J., concurring).
29
542 U.S. 692, 712 (2004).
30
Id. at 724.
31
Id. at 719 (“The anxieties of the pre-constitutional period cannot be ignored easily enough to think that the statute
was not meant to have a practical effect”).
32
Id. at 697.
26
27
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order to extend the interrogation and torture.33 When requests for help to the Mexican
government proved fruitless, the DEA successfully executed a plan to hire Mexican nationals to
seize Alvarez and bring him to the U.S. for trial.34 However, Alvarez returned to Mexico and
began a civil action against Sosa, several DEA agents, Mexican civilians and the U.S. after the
Supreme Court found that Alvarez’s forcible seizure did not affect the jurisdiction of a federal
court.35
Although the Supreme Court asserted that district courts would recognize private causes
of action for certain torts in violation of the law of nations, the Court restrained the discretion
that district courts should exercise in considering a new cause of action of this kind.36 The
Supreme Court required that “any claim based on the present-day law of nations rest on a norm
of international character accepted by the civilized world and defined with a specificity
comparable to the features of the eighteenth century paradigms,” which include violation of safe
conducts, infringement on the rights of ambassadors, and piracy.37 Therefore, the Supreme Court
reasoned that a single illegal detention of less than a day, followed by the transfer of custody to
lawful authorities and a prompt arraignment, does not violate customary international law norms
so well defined as to support the create of a federal remedy.38
D. Limiting Extraterritoriality: Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum
The source of most modern ATS debate surrounds the holding of Kiobel v. Royal Dutch
Petroleum Company39, which virtually brought all pending ATS litigation to a halt.40 The

33

Id. at 697.
Id. at 698.
35
Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 698 (2004).
36
Id. at 725.
37
Id.
38
Id. at 738.
39
133 U.S. 1659 (2013).
34
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plaintiffs in Kiobel were Nigerian nationals who now reside in the Untied States as legal
residents after seeking political asylum from alleged atrocities.41 The plaintiffs claimed that
Dutch, British, and Nigerian corporations aided and abetted the Nigerian government in
committing violations of the law of nations in Nigeria.42 More specifically, the complaint alleges
that the Nigerian military and police forces attacked Plaintiffs’ villages, beating, raping, killing,
and arresting residents and destroying or looting property after Plaintiffs began protesting the
environmental effects of Royal Dutch Petroleum’s oil exploration and production in the region.43
The Supreme Court’s unanimous decision was fractured by four distinct opinions.44
The majority of the Court, lead by Chief Justice Roberts (joined by Justices Scalia,
Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito), held that courts exercising their power under the ATS are
constrained by the presumption against extraterritorial application.45 The presumption against
extraterritoriality provides that, “[w]hen a statute gives no clear indication of an extraterritorial
application, it has none,” and to rebut the presumption, a statute would need to demonstrate a
“clear indication of extraterritoriality.”46 Although the Court originally granted certiorari to
consider whether the law of nations recognizes corporate liability, the majority reasoned that the
Kiobel plaintiffs’ claims were barred because the events occurred on the soil of a foreign
sovereign state and thus, none of the conduct took place within U.S. jurisdiction.47 As Chief

40

Rich Samp, Supreme Court Observations: Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum & the Future of Alien Tort Litigation,
FORBES (April 18, 2013, 10:51 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/wlf/2013/04/18/supreme-court-observationskiobel-v-royal-dutch-petroleum-the-future-of-alien-tort-litigation/.
41
Kiobel, at 1663.
42
Id. at 1662.
43
Id. at 1662–63.
44
Id. at 1659.
45
Id. at 1662.
46
Id. (quoting Morrison v. National Australia Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247 (2010); See also EEOC v. Arabian American
Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 248 (1991) (This presumption “serves to protect against unintended clashes between our laws
and those of other nations which could result in international discord”).
47
Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 U.S. 1659, 1662 (2013) (After oral argument, the Supreme Court
directed the parties to file supplemental briefs addressing an additional question: “Whether and under what
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Justice Roberts acknowledges, the presumption against extraterritoriality is typically used to
discern whether the substantive content of laws applies abroad, and is not utilized to determine
jurisdictional issues, like the ATS, which does not regulate conduct or afford relief.48
Although the Court in Kiobel found that all the relevant conduct took place outside the
U.S., the Court also stated in pertinent part that, “even where the claims touch and concern the
territory of the U.S., they must do so with sufficient force to displace the presumption against
exterritorial application. Corporations are often present in many countries, and it would reach too
far to say mere corporate presence suffices.”49 The majority opinion, however, gives no
indication of what may constitute sufficient contact to displace the presumption against
extraterritoriality, and this lack of clarity is lamented in the concurring opinions.50
Justice Kennedy’s deciding fifth vote is accompanied by a concise and explicit opinion,
in which Kennedy agreed with the Court’s narrow holding tailored to the case at hand.51
Nevertheless, Justice Kennedy also acknowledged that extraterritorial human rights abuses
committed abroad where neither the Kiobel holding nor a statute, such as the Torture Victim
Protection Act of 1991 (“TVPA”), are applicable, “proper implementation of the presumption
against extraterritorial application may require some further elaboration and explanation.”52
Justice Alito argued in his concurrence that causes of action under the ATS should be
barred unless the domestic conduct violates an international law norm sufficient to meet the Sosa

circumstances the [ATS] allows courts to recognize a cause of action for violations of the law of nations occurring
within the territory of a sovereign other than the United States.”).
48
Id. at 1664; see Oona Hathaway, Kiobel Commentary: The door remains open to “foreign squared”
cases, SCOTUSblog (Apr. 18, 2013, 4:27 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2013/04/kiobel-commentary-the-doorremains-open-to-foreign-squared-cases/ (calling the presumption against extraterritoriality an “odd fit” in the ATS
context).
49
Kiobel, at 1669.
50
Id. at 1670 (Alito, J., concurring) (arguing that the majority’s narrow approach leaves much unanswered).
51
Id. at 1671 (Kennedy J., concurring).
52
Id. at 1671–72 (Kennedy J., concurring); 28 U.S.C. §1350 (2006).

9

requirements of definitiveness and acceptance among nations.53 Since none of the acts in Kiobel
took place domestically, Justice Alito would find the claim barred by the presumption against
extraterritoriality.54
In his concurrence, Justice Breyer rejects invoking the presumption against
extraterritoriality because it “rests on the perception that Congress ordinarily legislates with
respect to domestic, not foreign matters.”55 Under Justice Breyer’s test, there would be
jurisdiction under the ATS where: “(1) the alleged tort occurs on American soil, (2) the
defendant is an American national, or (3) the defendant’s conduct substantially and adversely
affects an important American national interest, and that includes a distinct interest in preventing
the U.S. from becoming a safe harbor (free of civil as well as criminal liability) for a torturer or
other common enemy of mankind”56 Further, Justice Breyer relied on Sosa to determine the
extent to which the courts may permit ATS claims of those harmed by activities that take place
abroad and provides much needed guidance to the majority’s standard.57
While the first prong of the Breyer test is not controversial, as it is a literal translation of
the touch and concern test, the second and third prongs present the possibility of divergence from
the majority standard.58 Ultimately, Breyer agreed with the majority and concluded that the
plaintiffs’ claims in Kiobel did not fall within the jurisdictional view, since neither the plaintiffs
nor the defendants were U.S. citizens, the conduct occurred abroad, and there was no distinct

Id. at 1662 (Alito, J., concurring).
Id.
55
Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 U.S. 1659, 1671–72 (2013) (Breyer, J., concurring) (citing Morrison v.
National Australia Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247 (2010)).
56
Id. at 1672 (Breyer, J., concurring)
57
Id. at 1672, 1677 (Breyer, J., concurring) (noting that Congress has not sought to limit the statute’s jurisdictional
or substantive reach in the wake of Sosa).
58
Compare Kiobel, 133 U.S. at 1669 with Kiobel, 133 U.S. at 1674 (Breyer, J., concurring).
53
54
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U.S. interest present in the case, the plaintiffs’ claims in Kiobel did not fall within this
jurisdictional view.59
After Kiobel, in 2014, the Supreme Court created an additional hurdle against
transnational businesses in U.S. courts. In Daimler AG v. Bauman,60 the Court held that due
process did not permit the exercise of general jurisdiction over a corporation that is not
headquartered or incorporated within its jurisdiction.61 The case involved a claim by foreign
plaintiffs against a foreign defendant based on events that occurred entirely outside the United
States.62 However, the significance of Bauman is still indeterminable as a result of the unsettled
standard of the Kiobel. On the one hand, Kiobel may limit the consequences of Bauman and on
the other, Bauman could become another significant barrier.
III. KIOBEL AFTERMATH: ANALYSIS OF THE GROWING SPLIT
This part will evaluate the growing split amongst circuit courts in light of the minimal
guidance provided by the Kiobel decision. Since Kiobel’s issuance, courts have uniformly
applied the presumption against extraterritoriality to all ATS litigation, although circuit courts
have employed the presumption, and its ancillary touch and concern test, in both narrow and
broad fashions. As courts continue to decipher Kiobel, questions of what allegations are
sufficient to satisfy the touch and concern requirement and issues of corporate liability remain
unresolved.63

Kiobel, 133 U.S. at 1678 (Breyer, J., concurring).
134 S.Ct. 746 (2014).
61
Id.
62
Id. at 751.
63
Ralph G. Steinhardt, Kiobel and the Multiple Futures of Corporate Liability for Human Rights Violations, 28 MD.
J. INT'L L. 1, 22 (2013) ([G]iven the level of public interest in the case and the extensive briefing, it was a shock that
the Kiobel Court was utterly silent on whether corporations even in principle can have international obligations to
respect human rights norms.”).
59
60
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The Supreme Court in Kiobel relied heavily on Morrison v. National Australia Bank,64
which established the principal that, “[w]hen a statute gives no clear indication of an
extraterritorial application, it has none.”65 Nonetheless, Kiobel did not sign a death sentence for
the ATS because it only eliminated from future ATS litigation those ATS actions discussed in
Morrison: “foreign cubed” ATS actions in which (1) foreign plaintiffs are suing (2) a foreign
defendant in an American court for conduct that took place entirely within (3) foreign territory.66
Therefore, “foreign squared” cases, where the plaintiff or defendant is a U.S. national or where
the conduct occurred on U.S. soil may still be “on the table”.67 Chief Justice Roberts leaves the
door open for extraterritorial ATS cases.68 However, in the entirety of the Kiobel majority
opinion, Chief Justice Roberts references the “touch and concern” exactly once, leaving many
questions as to what specifically the test entails.69
A. Misguided Clarity: Kiobel’s Phantom Bright Line Rule
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals held in Balintulo v. Daimler AG70 that, where
plaintiffs have failed to allege that any relevant conduct occurred in the U.S., Kiobel foreclosed
the plaintiff’s ATS claims.71 In Balintulo, South African victims of apartheid brought suits
against corporate defendants, including Daimler, Ford, and IBM, for aiding and abetting

561 U.S. 247 (2010).
Kiobel, 133 U.S. at 1661 (citing Morrison, 561 U.S. at 261).
66
Morrison, 561 U.S. at 247, 283 n. 11 (emphasis added); see Oona Hathaway, Kiobel Commentary: The door
remains open to “foreign squared” cases, SCOTUSBLOG (Apr. 18, 2013, 4:27 PM),
http://www.scotusblog.com/2013/04/kiobel-commentary-the-door-remains-open-to-foreign-squared-cases/.
67
Hathaway, supra note 66.
68
Kiobel, 133 U.S. at 1669; Hathaway, supra note 66.
69
Kiobel, 133 U.S. at 1669 (“And even where the claims touch and concern the territory of the United States, they
must do so with sufficient force to displace the presumption against extraterritorial application. . . . Corporations are
often present in many countries, and it would reach too far to say that mere corporate presence suffices.”) (internal
citations omitted).
70
727 F.3d 174 (2d Cir. 2013).
71
Id. at 189.
64
65
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violations of customary international law committed by the South African government. 72 The
court pointedly rejected the Plaintiff’s argument that, although “mere corporate presence” is
inadequate to “touch and concern” the U.S. with “sufficient force,” corporate citizenship in the
U.S. is satisfactory.73 Nevertheless, the court did not address the factual distinctions of corporate
citizenship from mere corporate presence.74 The court reiterates that the relevant conduct
occurred in South Africa, consciously ignoring the “touch and concern” element of the
majority’s opinion in Kiobel and maintaining that the court had “no reason to explore, less
explain, how courts should proceed when some of the relevant conduct occurs in the Untied
States.”75
The Second Circuit adopts the view expressed by Justice Alito’s concurrence in Kiobel,
although the court also acknowledges that the Supreme Court neither adopted Justice Alito’s
reasoning nor rejected it, rather, “the majority simply left open any questions regarding the
permissible reach of cause of action under the ATS when some domestic activity is involved in
the case.”76

However, the same conclusion can be reached concerning Justice Breyer’s

concurrence, which would have allowed jurisdiction since the defendant is an American
national.77 Curiously, the court in Balintulo cites Kiobel in support of Second Circuit precedent
that corporations are not proper defendants under the ATS, when it is unmistakable that the case

Id. at 179–80 (Plaintiffs claim that these subsidiary companies sold cars and computers to the South African
government and consequently facilitated the apartheid regime’s innumerable race-based injustices, rapes, tortures,
and extrajudicial killings).
73
Id. at 189–90 (“Accordingly, if all relevant conduct occurred abroad, that is simply the end of the matter under
Kiobel).
74
Id. at 191.
75
Id.
76
Balintulo v. Daimler AG, 727 F.3d 174, 191 n. 26 (2d Cir. 2013); see also Chowdhury v. Worldtel Bangl.
Holding, Ltd., 746 F.3d 42, 45–46, 49–50 (2d Cir. 2014) (applying Kiobel to foreclose jurisdiction over ATS claims
filed by a Bangladeshi plaintiff who allegedly was detained and tortured by the Bangladesh National Police at the
direction of his Bangladeshi business partner).
77
Kiobel, 133 U.S. at 1674 (Breyer, J., concurring).
72
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was decided on other grounds.78 The court simultaneously denied that the Apartheid victims had
alleged any relevant U.S.-based conduct, while also ignoring their allegations that Defendants
took affirmative steps in the United States to circumvent the sanctions regime, and supplied the
South African government with their products, notwithstanding legal restriction against trade
with South Africa.79 The Second Circuit held that this U.S.-based conduct was not tied to the
relevant human rights violations.80
The Eleventh Circuit has reached similar conclusions.81 In Baloco v. Drummond
Company,82 the court concluded that the claimed violations of the law of nations did not meet the
touch and concern test established by Kiobel and thus, did not displace the presumption and the
claims were subsequently dismissed.83

The plaintiffs alleged that Drummond Company, a

closely held corporation with its principal place of business in Alabama, operated a coal mining
operation in Columbia that aided and abetted or conspired with the Autodefensas Unidas de
Columbia (“AUC”) by directly funding some of its operations.84 Plaintiffs also alleged that
Drummond collaborated with the AUC to commit murders, which occurred in the context of an
armed conflict between the AUC and FARC, a leftist guerilla organization, and hence, Plaintiffs
classify the murders as war crimes.85 The Eleventh Circuit found that since the extrajudicial
killings and war crimes alleged in the complaint occurred in Columbia, the conduct was not
sufficient to warrant the extraterritorial application of the ATS, notwithstanding that Drummond

Balintulo, 727 F.3d at 191 n. 26.
Id. at 192.
80
Id.
81
See generally Jaramillo v. Naranjo, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 138887 (stating that the Eleventh Circuit has adopted a
narrow reading of post-Kiobel ATS jurisdiction that focused primarily on the territorial location of the allegations).
82
767 F.3d 1229 (2014).
83
Id. at 1235.
84
Id. at 1233.
85
Id. at 1234 (explaining that the AUC is an organization affiliated with Colombia’s military and which provided
security against guerilla attacks for Drummond’s coal mining facility and operations).
78
79
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was a U.S. national.86 However, unlike Kiobel which did not involve a U.S. corporate national
or any defendant conduct that occurred within the United States, the court in Baloco admitted
“these murders ‘touch and concern the territory of the United States’ (because of Drummond’s
alleged involvement).”87 Nonetheless, the court ruled that the “claims are not focused within the
United States” and thus, failed to displace the presumption against extraterritorial application.88
Furthermore, the court denied Plaintiffs’ request for remand, which would have allowed that
district court cto consider Plaintiff’s request to amend their complaint in light of Kiobel.89
B. Touch and Concern as a Fact Based Analysis
The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals in Al Shimari v. CACI Premier Technology, Inc.90
held that the plaintiff’s claims, which alleged that a U.S. corporation tortured and mistreated
Iraqi citizens during their detention at the Abu Gharib prison in Iraq as suspected enemy
combatants, touched and concerned the territory of the United States with sufficient force to
displace the presumption against extraterritorial application of the ATS. 91 Due to a shortage of
trained military interrogators, the United States hired CACI Premier Technology, Inc. (“CACI”),
a corporation domiciled in Virginia, to provide private interrogators.92 Plaintiff’s alleged that
CACI employees instigated, directed, participated in, encouraged, and aided and abetted conduct
towards the detainees and that CACI’s managers failed to investigate or to report accusations of

Id. at 1236. (stating that the issue is not whether the murders “touch and concern” the United States, as plaintiffs
suggest, but rather whether the murders “touch and concern the territory of the United States.”) (citing Kiobel, 133
U.S. at 1669).
87
Id. at 1237–38 (citing Morrison, 561 U.S. 247).
88
Baloco v. Drummond Co., 767 F.3d 1229, 1238 (2014) (explaining that the extraterritoriality inquiry turns on
where the transaction that is the focus of the statute at issue occurred) (emphasis in original).
89
Id. at 1239.
90
758 F.3d 516 (4th Cir. 2014).
91
Id. at 520 (4th Cir. 2014). “Photos depicting abuse of Abu Ghraib detainees emerged in 2004. Some detainees
claimed they endured physical and sexual abuse, infliction of electric shocks, and mock executions.” Jonathan
Stempel, Abu Ghraib torture lawsuit revived by U.S. appeals court, REUTERS (June 30, 2014 2:10 PM),
http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/06/30/us-abughraib-caci-idUSKBN0F51BK20140630.
92
Id.
86
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wrongdoing and repeatedly denied that any CACI employees had engaged in abusive conduct. 93
The Fourth Circuit maintains that the clear implication of the Supreme Court’s “touch and
concern” language is that the court should not assume that the presumption categorically bars
cases that manifest a close connection to U.S. territory; rather, “a fact-based analysis is required
in such cases to determine whether courts may exercise jurisdiction over certain ATS claims.”94
In evaluating the “touch and concern” requirement, the court evaluated several factors,
namely CACI’s “having won U.S. government permission to conduct interrogations and obtain
security clearances, and allegations that CACI managers in the United States acquiesced in, or
concealed, misconduct.”95 By distinguishing the attenuated connection to the United States
territory reflected by the facts in Kiobel to the allegations of torture committed by U.S. citizens
who were employed by a U.S. corporation in Al Shimari, the court was able to conclude that
these claims surpass the “mere corporate presence” which was fatal in Kiobel, in order to
overcome the presumption of extraterritoriality.96 The court observed that “mechanically
applying the presumption to bar these ATS claims would not advance the purposes of the
presumption,” since the plaintiffs in Al Shimari sought to enforce the customary law of nations
against torture and the case did not present any potential problems associated with bringing
foreign nationals into U.S. courts to answer for conduct committed abroad, given that the
defendants are U.S. citizens.97 Unlike the Second Circuit, the Fourth Circuit employs the “touch
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Al Shimari, 758 F.3d at 520–22.
Id. at 528–29 (considering a broader range of facts than the location where the plaintiffs actually sustained their
injuries).
95
Stempel, supra note 91.
96
Al Shimari, 758 F.3d at 528.
97
Id. at 529–30 (“A basic premise of the presumption against extraterritorial application is that United States courts
must be wart of international discord resulting from unintended clashes between our laws and those of other
nations.”) (citing Sexual Minorities Uganda v. Lively, 960 F.Supp.2d 304, 322–24 (D.Mass. 2013) (holding that
Kiobel did not bar ATS claims against an American citizen, in part because “[t]his is not a case where a foreign
national is being hailed into an unfamiliar court to defend himself”).
94
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and concern” test “by considering a broader range of facts than just the location where the
plaintiffs actually sustained their injuries.”98
Most recently, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in Doe I v. Nestle USA, Inc.,99 similarly
rejected a blanket ruling against extraterritoriality and in light of Kiobel’s ambiguous “touch and
concern” standard, and remanded the case for further proceedings.100 The plaintiffs were three
victims of child slavery who allege that Nestlé and other defendants “aided and abetted child
slavery by providing assistance to Ivorian farmers.”101 The court reasoned that:
[d]espite their knowledge of child slavery and their control over the cocoa market,
the defendants operate in the Ivory Coast ‘with the unilateral goal of finding the
cheapest sources of cocoa.’ The defendants continue to supply money, equipment,
and training to Ivorian farmers, knowing that these provisions will facilitate the
use of forced child labor.102
The court rejected the defendant’s argument to apply the Morrison “focus test,” noting
that while the test may be informative, Kiobel did not explicitly adopt the “focus test,”
and instead chose “touch and concern” when articulating the legal standard.103
IV. REEXAMINATION OF CARDONA
A. Majority
98

Id. at 529; but see Chowdhury v. Worldtel Bangl. Holding, Ltd., 746 F.3d 42, 45–46, 49–50 (2d Cir. 2014)
(applying Kiobel to foreclose jurisdiction over ATS claims filed by a Bangladeshi plaintiff who allegedly was
detained and tortured by the Bangladesh National Police at the direction of his Bangladeshi business partner).
99
766 F.3d 1013 (9th Cir. 2014).
100
Id. at 1028 (“Rather than attempt to apply the amorphous touch and concern test on the record currently before
us, we conclude that the plaintiffs should have the opportunity to amend their complaint in light of Kiobel”).
101
Id. at 1016–17 (“They were forced to work on Ivorian cocoa plantations for up to fourteen hours per day six days
a week, given only scraps of food to eat, and whipped and beaten by overseers. They were locked in small rooms at
night and not permitted to leave the plantations, knowing that children who tried to escape would be beaten or
tortured. Plaintiff John Doe II witnessed guards cut open the feet of children who attempted to escape, and John Doe
III knew that the guards forced failed escapees to drink urine.”)
102
Id. at 1017–18 (noting that defendants have also lobbied against congressional efforts to curb the use of child
slave labor).
103
Id. at 1028 (citing Morrison, 130 U.S. at 2284 (the focus test states that a cause of action falls outside the
presumption against extraterritoriality only if the events or relationships that are the focus of congressional concern
in the relevant statute occur within the United States)); Kiobel, 133 U.S. at 1669. See Mark J. Mullaney, Ninth
Circuit Allows Child Slaves to Amend Complaint to Satisfy New Kiobel Standard, INT’L RIGHTS ADVOCATES (Sept.
26, 2014 12:16 PM), http://www.iradvocates.org/blog/ninth-circuit-allows-child-slaves-amend-complaint-satisfynew-kiobel-standard (“The court rejected the Defendants’ calls to directly apply the restrictive Morrison “focus”
test, observing that Kiobel explicitly avoided using the terms of art found in Morrison.”).
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On interlocutory review, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals determined that the
complaints did not state claims within the jurisdiction of the United States courts.104 The court
did not address the specific questions that were certified for review.105 The court acknowledged
that the Supreme Court acted with respect to the ATS during the pendency of this appeal and
drew a similarity between Kiobel and Cardona with respect to actions by a corporation in
conjunction with paramilitary actors within a foreign territory.106 In reaching its holding, the
majority maintained that the distinction between the corporation in Kiobel, which was present in
the United States, and the corporation in Cardona, a U.S. corporation, did not lead to “any
indication of a congressional intent to make the statute apply to extraterritorial torts . . . ‘[i]f
Congress were to determine otherwise, a statute more specific than the ATS would be
required.’”107 Thus, the court plainly concluded, “[t]here is no other statute. There is no
jurisdiction.”108 According to the majority, Chiquita’s U.S. citizenship is completely irrelevant to
the ATS evaluation.109
The court rationalized its holding by noting the history of the ATS, namely Sosa,
precluded the court from applying the ATS to the allegations in Cardona.110 In evaluating the
touch and concern test, the majority stated without further explanation that, “[t]here is no
allegation that any torture occurred on U.S. territory, or that any other act constituting a tort in
terms of the ATS touched or concerned the territory of the United States with any force.”111
Consequently, as the murders at the center of the plaintiffs’ allegations took place in Colombia,

Cardona v. Chiquita Brands Int’l, Inc., 760 F.3d 1185, 1187 (11th Cir. 2014).
Id. at 1188 (“Because we conclude that neither this court nor the district court has jurisdiction over the action, we
untimely will not answer those specific questions . . .”).
106
Id. at 1189.
107
Id. (quoting Kiobel, 133 U.S. at 1669).
108
Id.
109
See generally Cardona v. Chiquita Brands Int’l, Inc., 760 F.3d 1185 (11th Cir. 2014).
110
Id. at 1190.
111
Id. at 1191.
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the majority chose not to apply the touch and concern test at all, reflecting an extremely
restrictive version of the test advocated by Justice Alito’s concurrence in Kiobel.112 However,
many have criticized the ruling as impudent in light of the facts and the infamous legacy of
Chiquita’s operations in developing nations.113 The majority did not address, let alone consider,
the allegations of U.S.-based aiding and abetting or that Chiquita’s actions were U.S. crimes
under anti-terrorism laws.114
B. Dissent
The dissent argues in the alternative, that facts of Cardona are sufficient to overcome the
presumption against extraterritoriality.115

First, the primary defendant is Chiquita Brands

International, a corporation headquartered and incorporated within the territory of the United
States.116 Second, Chiquita “participated in a campaign of torture and murder in Columbia by
reviewing, approving, and concealing a scheme of payments and weapons shipments to
Columbian terrorist organizations, all from their corporate offices in the territory of the United
States.”117 Chiquita’s U.S.-based officials took substantial measures to conceal these payments
over and over again by issuing checks payable to individual employees who would endorse the
checks, convert them to cash, and then deliver the funds to the AUC. 118 Through this analysis of
touch and concern test, Judge Martin found that the plaintiffs met the Kiobel standard.

Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Company, 133 U.S. 1659, 1670 (2013) (Alito, J., concurring).
Cohen, supra note 9. “This opinion is shockingly negligent in terms of just actually dealing with the facts and
dealing with the issues. . . . It’s almost flippant in terms of just gleefully throwing the case out.” Id. (quoting Terry
Collingsworth, one of the chief litigators for the Chiquita victims, in an interview with Think Progress).
114
Cardona v. Chiquita Brands Int’l, Inc., 760 F.3d 1185 (11th Cir. 2014), petition for cert. filed, 2014 WL 7463974
(U.S. Dec. 30, 2014) (No. 14-777).
115
Cardona, 760 F. 3d at 1192 (Martin, J., dissenting).
116
Id.
117
Id.
118
Cardona v. Chiquita Brands Int’l, Inc., 760 F.3d 1185 (11th Cir. 2014), petition for cert. filed, 2014 WL 7463974
(U.S. Dec. 30, 2014) (No. 14-777).
112
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The dissent distinguished the facts from Kiobel by noting that plaintiffs do not rely on
Chiquita’s “mere corporate presence” to justify ATS jurisdiction, as it is incorporated in New
Jersey and headquartered in Ohio.119 This case is not a case where a defendant is being haled
into court under the ATS for action that took place on foreign soil or which plaintiffs are seeking
to circumvent the presumption against extraterritoriality by holding an American company
vicariously liable for the unauthorized action of its subsidiaries overseas. 120 Thus, the dissent
concluded that the touch and concern test is satisfied when a defendant aids and abets overseas
torts from within the United States.121 Judge Martin derided the court’s unwillingness to enforce
the ATS and by doing so, “we disarm innocents against American corporations that engage in
human rights violations abroad. I understand the ATS to have been deliberately crafted to avoid
this regrettable result.”122
C. Distinguishing Kiobel and Cardona
Through its mechanically application of Kiobel in Cardona, the Eleventh Circuit ignored
the major distinctions between the two cases.123 In Kiobel, all of the atrocities were alleged to
have been committed in Nigeria, the defendants were Dutch, British, and Nigerian corporations,
and there only relevant connection to the U.S. consisted of their corporate listing on the New
York Stock Exchange and their affiliation with a public relations office in New York.124
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Cardona, 760 F. 3d at 1192 (Martin, J., dissenting).
Id. at 1194.
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Id. at 1194–95 (Martin, J., dissenting). See, e.g. Al Shimari v. CACI Premier Tech., Inc., 758 F.3d 516 (4th Cir.
2014); Sexual Minorities Uganda v. Lively, 960 F.Supp.2d 304 (D.Mass. 2013); Mwani v. Laden 947 F. Supp. 2d 1
(D.D.C. 2013); Krishanti v. Rajaratnam, 2014 WL 1669873 (D.N.J. Apr. 28, 2014).
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Cardona, 760 F. 3d at 1195 (Martin, J., dissenting); Lauren Carasik, The uphill battle to hold US corporation
accountable for abuses abroad, ALJAZEERA AMERICA (Aug. 8, 2014 6:00 AM),
http://america.aljazeera.com/opinions/2014/8/chiquita-corporateaccountabilityunitednationshumanrights.html.
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Press Release, International Rights Advocates, Eleventh Circuit Decision in Chiquita Tort Status Litigation (July,
25, 2014), http://www.iradvocates.org/press-release/chiquita/press-release-eleventh-circuit-decision-chiquita-alientort-status-litigation.
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Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 U.S. 1659, 1677 (2013) (Breyer, J., concurring); see also Paul L.
Hoffman, Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co.: First Impressions, 52 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 28, 31 (2013)
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“Moreover, none of the defendants had engaged in any activities in the U.S. that appeared to be
relevant to the claimed tortious acts that occurred in Nigeria.”125
The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals adopted the approach of the Second Circuit and
held in Cardona that the “ATS contains nothing to rebut the presumption against
extraterritoriality” and thus, since the conduct, namely torture and death, occurred in Columbia,
the ATS is inapplicable.126

Unlike Kiobel, Chiquita is incorporated in New Jersey and

headquartered in Ohio, and the United States may regulate its own corporations and bears
responsibility for their acts under international law.127 Plaintiffs sought to hold Chiquita liable
for conduct that occurred in the United States, namely that they made one hundred separate
payments to the AUC that it reviewed, approved, and directed at the highest corporate levels
from its U.S. headquarters.128 Distinct from the facts in Kiobel, Chiquita actively participated in
a campaign of torture and murder in Colombia by reviewing, approving and concealing a scheme
of payments and weapons shipments to Colombia terrorist organization, all from their corporate
offices in the United States.129 Plaintiffs did not seek to circumvent the presumption against
extraterritoriality by holding Chiquita vicariously liable for the unauthorized actions of its
subsidiaries in Columbia. Chiquita was directly a participant in “widespread and systematic
human rights violations with indisputable evidence of actions taken by Chiquita in the United

(“Though the Court reformulated the question presented broadly, the application of the ATS to such so-called
‘foreign-cubed’ cases was at the heart of most of the briefing and argument).
125
Al Shimari v. CACI Premier Tech., Inc., 758 F.3d 516, 526 (4th Cir. 2014).
126
Cardona v. Chiquita Brands Int'l, Inc., 760 F.3d 1185, 1189–90 (11th Cir. 2014).
127
Id.; Brief for Plaintiffs-Appellants at 15, Cardona v. Chiquita Brands Int’l, 760 F. 3d 1185 (2014) (No. 1214898).
128
Brief for Plaintiffs-Appellants at 15, Cardona v. Chiquita Brands Int’l, 760 F. 3d 1185 (2014) (No. 12-14898).
129
Cardona, 760 F.3d at 1992 (Martin, J., dissenting) (concluding that plaintiff’s claims sufficiently “touch and
concern” the territory of the United States because they allege the Chiquita violation international law from within
the U.S. by offering substantial assistance to a campaign of violence abroad).
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States.”130 If Kiobel represents the end of the spectrum where the only connection to the United
States was mere corporate presence, Cardona falls on the opposite end, representing substantial
and repeated connections with the United States.
The majority applies a mechanical application of Kiobel, without considering a broader
range of facts, and failing to advance the purposes of the presumption.131 The Eleventh Circuit
pronounced: “because our ultimate disposition is not dependent on specificity of fact, we will
only briefly review the history of the case.”132 The majority opinion in Kiobel did not assert that
ATS only reaches domestic conduct—this interpretation appeared only in Justice Alito’s
concurrence, where he acknowledge his approach was more restrictive.133 It is also significant
that Chiquita pled guilty to providing support to the AUC, despite its designation as a terrorist
organization that threatens U.S. national security.134 Thus, the U.S. government has concluding
that providing support to the U.S. directly concerns vital national interests and violates U.S.
foreign policy and criminal law.135 Thus, Cardona undermines U.S. foreign policy and does not
reinforce international comity.136
The dissent in Cardona reasoned that Kiobel should not be read as “an impediment to
civilians harmed by a decades-long campaign of terror they plainly allege to have been

Cardona v. Chiquita Brands Int’l, Inc., 760 F.3d 1185 (11th Cir. 2014), petition for cert. filed, 2014 WL 7463974
(U.S. Dec. 30, 2014) (No. 14-777).
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Al Shimari v. CACI Premier Tech., Inc., 758 F.3d 516, 529-31 (4th Cir. 2014).
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Cardona, 760 F.3d at 1187–88.
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See generally Kiobel, 133 U.S. 1659 (2013); See also Al Shimari v. CACI Premier Tech., Inc. 516, 528 (4th Cir.
2014).
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Brief for Plaintiffs-Appellants at 15, Cardona v. Chiquita Brands Int’l, 760 F. 3d 1185 (2014) (No. 12-14898).
135
Id. at 20.
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See, e.g Press Release, Department of Justice, Chiquita Brands International Pleads Guilty to Making Payments
to a Designated Terrorist Organization And Agrees to Pay $25 Million Fine (Mar. 19, 2007), available at
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sponsored by an American corporation.”137 As the Second Circuit did in Balintulo, the Eleventh
Circuit ignored sensitive facts in reaching its conclusion, namely, the panel did not explain how
Chiquita’s support for terrorist could violate U.S. criminal law and undermine U.S. security, but
not “touch and concern” the United States.138 At sentencing, the U.S. government emphasized
the fact that Chiquita’s criminal acts caused the murders that arise out of the same nucleus of
facts. Not only did Chiquita aid and abet crimes against humanity, they also interfered with the
foreign policy of the United States, actions that should satisfy the touch and concern test and
allows for ATS jurisdiction.
D. Inconsistency with International Law
To begin with, it is a fundamental principle of international law that every State has the
sovereign authority to regulate the conduct of its own citizens, regardless of whether that conduct
occurs inside or outside of the State's territory. 139 The Restatement of Foreign Relations Law
explicitly permits a state to exercise jurisdiction.140 Kiobel reaffirmed that the primary basis for
the presumption against extraterritoriality is protection against “unintended clashes between our
laws and those of other nations which could result in international discord” that “should make
courts particularly wary of impinging on the discretion of the Legislative and Executive branches
in managing foreign affairs.”141 By flagrantly disregarding basic human rights, courts have failed
to meet expectations of international community and respect rights universally proclaimed by all
137

Cardona v. Chiquita Brands Int'l, Inc., 760 F.3d 1185 (11th Cir. 2014) (Martin, J., dissenting); see also Jonathan
Stempel, Chiquita wins dismissal of U.S. lawsuits over Colombian abuses, Reuters (July 24, 2014, 3:28 PM),
http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/07/24/chiquita-colombia-decision-idUSL2N0PZ28P20140724 (noting that in
March 2007, Chiquita pleaded guilty to a U.S. criminal charge and paid a $25 million fine for having made
payments from 1997 through February 2004 to the right-wing paramilitary group United Self-Defense Forces of
Colombia, known in Spanish as AUC).
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See Exec. Order No. 12,224,31 C.F.R. 595097 (2001) (blocking transactions with terrorists deemed to “threaten
the security of the U.S. national or the national security, foreign policy, or economy of the United States”).
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See Restatement (Third) of The Foreign Relations Law of the United States § 402(2) (1987); see also Cardona v.
Chiquita Brands Int'l, Inc., 760 F.3d 1185 (11th Cir. 2014) (Martin, J., dissenting).
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Kiobel, 133 U.S. at 1664.
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nations.142 Under international law and affirmed through the enactment of the ATS, the U.S.
consciously accepted an obligation to remedy those injured by their own citizens.
In Kiobel, foreign governments submitted amicus briefs that claimed the assertion of
ATS jurisdiction over their corporations violated international law. 143 These same concerns are
inapplicable in Cardona, where the defendant is a U.S. citizen. In agreement, the United States
argued that in their Kiobel brief that “the court should not articulate a categorical rule foreclosing
any such application of the ATS” as the United States may be responsible under international
law for the actions of U.S. citizens abroad.144 A corporation, incorporated and headquartered in
the United States, which operates worldwide, supporting from the territory of the United States,
the murder of thousands of men, women, and children is irrefutably a violation of international
law.
International law is part of our law, and must be ascertained and administered by
the courts of justice of appropriate jurisdiction as often as questions of right
depending upon it are duly presented for their determination. For this purpose,
where there is no treaty and no controlling executive or legislative act or judicial
decision, resort must be had to the customs and usages of civilized nations, and,
as evidence of these, to the works of jurists and commentators who by years of
labor, research, and experience have made themselves peculiarly well acquainted
with the subjects of which they treat.145
By flagrantly disregarding basic human rights, courts have failed to meet expectations of
international community and respect rights universally proclaimed by all nations.146
Responsibility for Chiquita’s callous actions lies with the Untied States.
E. Aiding and Abetting Liability Under the ATS
Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 890 (“Our holding today . . . is a small but important step in the fulfillment of the ageless
dream to free all people from brutal violence.”).
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Chiquita’s acts of aiding and abetting extra-judicial killings, war crimes and crimes
against humanity, which originated in the United States, are themselves torts in violation of the
law of nations. Aiding and abetting is recognized as a valid basis for liability under the ATS and
is a well-established norm of international law. “All international authorities agree that ‘at least
purposive action . . . constitutes aiding and abetting,’” although there is conflict concerning
whether the mens rea required for aiding and abetting claim is knowledge or purpose. 147 For
many ATS cases, the unresolved aiding and abetting standard could have great implications for
actions against transnational corporate defendants, as the purpose test is a much higher standard
than the knowledge test.
Regardless of the standard, defendants in Chiquita may be held liable under ATS as a
result of the theory of aiding and abetting. It is clear that Chiquita had knowledge that they were
cooperating with the a known terrorist organization and repeatedly ignored counsel to end their
relationship with the AUC. Chiquita acted with the purpose to violate the law by maintaining
contact with and supporting the AUC financially in exchange for asserting dominance in the
banana growing region.
F. Corporate Liability Under the ATS
There is no surprise that the question of the possibility of ATS litigation against
corporations has attracted attention and inconclusive answers.148 The corporate accountability
movement coupled with reservations of the potential impact on the business environment has
lead to starkly divergent responses.149

The drastic growth of transnational business and
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globalization has created a safe haven for multinational corporations in both developed and
underdeveloped countries that lack appropriate regulation. This section will argue that a
defendant’s corporate identity should not be dispositive in deciding whether there is jurisdiction
under the ATS. To hold otherwise, would be to immunize U.S. corporate entities operating in the
developing world from “liability arising from their facilitation of torture, destruction of property,
extra-judicial killing, and environmental catastrophes.”150
One of the most prominent issues that the Supreme Court in Kiobel left unanswered was
whether the law of nations recognizes corporate liability – whether multinational corporations
can be held civilly liable under the ATS for their actions or the actions of their subsidiaries and
agents.151 The only reference that the Supreme Court has made toward corporate liability under
the ATS is a footnote in Sosa, where the Court directed federal courts contemplating the
recognition of new ATS claims to consider “whether international law extends the scope of
liability for a violation of a given norm to the perpetrator being sued, if the defendant is a private
actor such as a corporation or individual.”152 The court did not address criminal liability and
some have questioned whether civil liability alone is an adequate response to “corporate
participation in unimaginable crimes that deeply shock the conscience of humanity.”153
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The Ninth Circuit affirmed three principles about ATS liability in Doe v. Nestle.154 First,
the analysis proceeds norm-by-norm; there is no categorical rule of corporate immunity or
liability.155 Second, corporate liability under an ATS claim does not depend on the existence of
international precedent enforcing legal norms against corporations.156 Third, norms that are
“universal and absolute,” or applicable to “all actors,” can provide the basis for an ATS claim
against a corporation.157 To determine whether a norm is universal, we consider, among other
things, whether it is “limited to states” and whether its application depends on the identity of the
perpetrator.

158

The court concluded that three former child slaves could assert their ATS claim

against corporate defendants, as the prohibition against slavery is universal and applies to state
actors and non-state actors alike.159
G. Human Rights Law
ATS litigation has highlighted the need for corporations to manage and seriously consider
any potential human rights violations, irrespective of an ultimate finding of liability. 160 The
European Commission in its amicus brief in Kiobel argues that, some wrongs, no longer limited
to piracy and slave trading, are “so repugnant that all States have a legitimate interest and
therefore have the authority to suppress and punish them.161 It is likely that in the wake of post-
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Kiobel litigation, plaintiffs will focus heavily on forum shopping depending on the facts of each
case and look for alternatives in transnational tort litigation.162
Allowing U.S. defendants to be sued for human rights abuses advances the policy of
denying safe haven.163 Filartiga underscores this importance; it paved the way to seek
accountability in U.S. courts in order to permit suits against those defendants who enjoy
protection of the U.S. legal system and whose egregious behavior is therefore a legitimate U.S.
concern.164 Redress for human rights violations requires due diligence. Thus, it is not that the
State guarantees a remedy or satisfaction for every violation, but instead, due diligence
obligations are usually considered obligations of conduct. Due diligence compels institutions,
such as the courts, to operate diligently and “[s]tates may incur responsibility if they are not
diligent in pursuing and preventing acts contrary to international law by prosecuting and
punishing the private perpetrators.”165 Nonetheless, human rights law does not bind non-state
actors, although corporate due diligence considerations are developing.
John Ruggie, the Secretary-General’s Special Representative for Business and Human
Rights, is one of the most influential contributors to international relations, where he has

“Litigation under the [ATS] is complex, drawn-out over many years, and results hinge on minute issues of civil
procedure. In many cases, the principal legal struggle concerns questions of international law and federal
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developed “Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights: Implementing the Untied
Nations ‘Protect, Respect and Remedy’ Framework” (the “Ruggie Framework”).166 The Ruggie
Framework has been called “the most comprehensive and authoritative global standard in the
area of business and human rights.167 In September 2013, the United Kingdom became the first
country to launch its implementation plan, which will guide companies on integrating human
rights into their operations.168 The action plan demonstrates “important leadership in relation to
the protection of human rights defenders working on issues of corporation accountability.” Most
notably, the action plan is intended to apply to UK companies operating both at home and
extraterritorially, to integrate human rights in their operations.169 Further, amendments to the UK
Companies Act has clarified that company directors will include human rights issues in their
annual reports.170
VI. CONCLUSION
Cardona reflects a radically narrow interpretation of the standard set by the Supreme
Court in Kiobel, in light of the facts surrounding the case, including the major distinctions
between the two cases. In an effort to strengthen international and multinational corporate
accountability, the U.S. and the Supreme Court cannot allow the growing power of multinational
corporations to hinder the development of a standard and framework that can properly regulate
the conduct of citizens, whether individuals or corporations, on foreign soil.
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Courts should not disregard a claim against a U.S. national, whose conduct violates the
law of nations, under the false pretext that the case mirrors Kiobel, thus preemptively barring the
claim before evaluating the facts of the case. To apply an ambiguous and unsettled standard so
restrictively is imprudent. Therefore, the Eleventh Circuit’s failure in Cardona to address the
factual allegations that the relevant conduct took place in the U.S., in order to determine if the
conduct touched and concerned the U.S. sufficiently to displace the presumption against
extraterritoriality is in direct contradiction with Kiobel and conflicts with other circuit courts.
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